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Abstract. Although growth opportunities fade and profitability declines as firms mature,
older firms are no more likely to be acquired than young firms are. This article documents
and explains that phenomenon. We argue that, because mature organizations are rationally
less flexible, they are more costly to integrate and therefore comparatively unattractive
acquisition candidates. The evidence supports this explanation of the negative age depend-
ence of takeover hazard. The evidence also shows that negative exogenous shocks to merger
benefits further reduce the takeover hazard of mature firms. We test many alternative
explanations and find no evidence that they can explain the hazard decline.
JEL Classification: G30, L20
1. Introduction
According to Fama and French (2004), the 10-year survival rate of listed
firms is only 53%. The main exit risk is takeover, which has a 10-year prob-
ability of 32% among seasoned firms and 22% among new lists. Takeover
risk seems to increase as firms get older. The evidence in Loderer, Stulz, and
Waelchli (2014) could explain why that is the case. Accordingly, more es-
tablished (older) firms are less profitable, have fewer growth opportunities,
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engage in less R&D, invest less, and generally score more poorly on corpor-
ate governance indices. Their governance structures might therefore be in-
adequate to bring about change and instill new life into the organization
(Scharfstein, 1988; Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1989). If so, takeover could
enforce restructuring, and its hazard should indeed increase over time. This
article examines whether that is the case and, if not, why.
Using a large sample of US listed firms over the period 1978–2009, we test
whether mature firms are more likely to delist because of takeover. The
evidence strongly rejects this prediction. The takeover hazard drops signifi-
cantly as firms get older. The decline in takeover hazard is more or less
continuous and economically tangible. For example, compared with a
5-year-old firm, the takeover hazard of a 25-year-old firm can be as much
as 32% lower. Since hazards are conditional probabilities, their decline is not
necessarily induced by sheer survival.
The remainder of the article is dedicated to explaining the phenomenon of
the negative age-dependence of takeover hazard. We first examine whether
the effect is driven by firm characteristics that have been found to correlate
with takeover risk. These characteristics include firm size (Comment and
Schwert, 1995; Cooley and Quadrini, 2001), financial frictions (Hadlock
and Pierce, 2010), growth–resource imbalances (Palepu, 1986), management
inefficiency (Manne, 1965; Jensen, 1986, 1993), asset mispricing (Palepu,
1986; Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002), cash holdings and borrowing
capacity (Bruner, 1988), potential overinvestment problems (Lehn and
Poulsen, 1989), manager age, the presence of CEOs in retirement age
(Jenter and Lewellen, 2014), the age of the firm’s product market lines,
and the availability of merger partners with similar products, size, and valu-
ation multiples (Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson, 2008; Hoberg and Phillips,
2010), among others. Many of these variables, such as firm size, cash
holdings, and the similarity measures, are proxies suggested in the literature
for the synergistic value of the acquisition of the firm in question. According
to the evidence, the age-related decline of takeover risk remains even after
controlling for these effects. Hence, general lack of synergies does not seem
to explain this finding. This remains so also when controling for competing
exit risks as well as for unobserved heterogeneity.
We also find no evidence that overpricing of the stock of established firms
is what discourages takeover. Furthermore, the negative age dependence of
merger hazard does not seem to be driven by a search-cost hypothesis, ac-
cording to which older firms simply survived the screening by potential ac-
quirers and therefore face an increasingly smaller pool of interested partners
to merge with.
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If established firms are comparatively less frequently involved in take-
overs, it must ultimately be because they resist takeover or because they
are comparatively more costly to integrate into other organizations. We
test these two interpretations of the evidence. According to the takeover-
resistance interpretation, managers could have a preference for a quiet life
(Hicks, 1935; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; Giroud and Mueller, 2010)
and therefore decide to work less and simply milk the available lines of
business. Managers might therefore resist takeover for fear of compromising
their quiet life. If the managers of mature firms had less valuable outside
employment opportunities, such takeover resistance would be particularly
pronounced there. Yet we find little evidence that older firms erect antitake-
over barriers. If anything, they take them down.
The alternative interpretation for why established firms are comparatively
unattractive takeover targets is because of higher integration costs. These
costs can be quite substantial. According to a recent survey conducted by EY
(2014), firms, on average, spend 14% of the deal value on merger
integration.
Holmstrom (1989) argues that established firms primarily serve produc-
tion and marketing goals. To pursue these goals, mature firms rationally
depend on rules that induce bureaucratization and compromise innovation.
Since this focusing process takes time, these “rigidities” (Leonard-Barton,
1992) accumulate over time and render mature firms increasingly impervious
to change (Henderson, 1993; Gompers, Lerner, and Scharfstein, 2005).
Because of these rigidities, established firms are more costly to integrate in
different organizations, which could explain why takeover risk drops with
firm age. We conduct two separate tests of this integration costs interpret-
ation of the negative age-dependence of takeover risk and find supporting
evidence.
The first test looks at how negative exogenous industry shocks affect
takeover risk at older age. The assumption is that merger integration costs
do not depend strongly on business conditions. Merger benefits, however,
are positively related to business conditions. At times of adverse shocks to
business conditions, firms with high merger integration costs should have
particularly low takeover hazards because the gains to takeover drop
whereas the integration costs remain constant. To the extent that firm age
is a proxy for integration costs, we would therefore expect that the takeover
risk of old firms falls further at times of industry distress. The evidence
supports this prediction. To test it, we follow Opler and Titman (1994)
and Gopalan and Xie (2011), among others, and assume that an industry
is in distress if median sales growth is negative and median stock return is
below 30%. Compared with normal times, we find that the predicted
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takeover hazard of a mature firm drops by almost 50% at times of industry
distress (from 3.7% to 1.7%), whereas that of a young firm is unaffected
(4.1%). This shock test controls for the synergistic value of the sample firms.
Hence, it does not depend on the distribution of potential synergies that can
be achieved from merging with old or young firms.
The second test looks for distinctive symptoms of corporate rigidities and
asks whether they can explain the negative age-dependence of takeover risk.
The rigidities we consider refer to the firm’s cost structure, its investment
policy, its product portfolio, as well as its organizational structure. All
rigidity measures correlate positively and strongly with firm age.
Moreover, the presence of these rigidities reduces takeover hazard signifi-
cantly. However, individually, these rigidities fail to explain the negative age
effect we find. Only when we combine them in the same regression does the
age effect disappear, whereas the individual rigidity measures maintain their
negative and significant influence. Therefore, the evidence implies that it is
not a single type of rigidity that renders established firms unattractive
merger partner but the accumulation of such rigidities.
This article focuses on takeover hazard, the main exit hazard of listed
firms. However, because we control for competing risks in our econometric
approach, the investigation also provides new insights into the age-depend-
ence of financial failure hazard. We find that the failure hazard of firms
declines with age, too. The extant empirical literature reports inconclusive
results in this respect, although theoretical priors predict a decline. For
example, studies on the dynamics of the firms’ investment behavior
(Cooley and Quadrini, 2001), learning (Jovanovic, 1982; Pastor and
Veronesi, 2003), and access to the capital market (Hadlock and Pierce,
2010) imply declining failure hazards over time. Shumway (2001),
however, finds no relation between listing age and bankruptcy probability.
Since we control for all the standard variables that have been found to
influence financial failure, the decline in failure hazard we uncover can
hardly be explained with factors such as low leverage, low uncertainty, or
better profitability. One possible interpretation is that mature firms have
better networks and are therefore better at achieving out-of-court solutions
for their financial problems. At the same time, because of these connections,
creditors are more reluctant to force these firms into bankruptcy since the
reputation costs of doing so are comparatively high. During times of
industry distress, however, we find that the hazard of financial failure
more than doubles for mature firms. Possible interpretations are that finan-
cial failure serves as an alternative crisis resolution mechanism to takeover
(Stiglitz, 1972; Shrievens and Stevens, 1979; Pastena and Ruland, 1986;
2280 C. LODERERANDU.WAELCHLI
Jensen, 2000), or that generalized distress allows creditors to trigger the
bankruptcy filing of mature firms without having to bear the blame.
Taken together, the article makes the following contributions to the lit-
erature. First, we document that takeover hazard declines with age, even in
the context of competing hazards and controlling for unobserved heterogen-
eity. Second, the article explains that decline. Older firms are comparatively
unattractive acquisition candidates at current market prices because, with
their rigid structures, they are more costly to integrate. Third, we contribute
to a better understanding of takeover as the main mechanism of resource
allocation in the economy, and therefore to a better understanding of the
dynamics of economic growth. Growth is accompanied by frequent reallo-
cations and recycling of resources via takeover. That reallocation process,
however, abates when it comes to mature firms.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the
sample and discusses the empirical strategy. Section 3 studies the relation
between firm age and takeover hazard. It also discusses the economic rele-
vance of the age-related decline in exit hazards we find. Section 4 asks
whether that negative dependence could reflect an attempt by the
managers of older firms to keep their firms independent. Section 5
examines whether it is comparatively higher integration costs that render
mature firms unattractive takeover candidates. Section 6 briefly discusses
the age-dependence of failure hazard. Finally, Section 7 presents
conclusions.
2. Sample Description and Research Design
2.1 SAMPLE DESCRIPTION
The sample consists of all listed firms with data on CRSP, COMPUSTAT,
and COMPUSTAT Industry Segment between 1978 and 2009. We exclude
utilities as well as firms in the financial sector of the economy (SIC 6000–
6999). Moreover, we ignore firm-years with negative total assets or sales,
missing data on COMPUSTAT Segments, and cumulative sales on the
COMPUSTAT Segments tapes which deviate by more than 1% from the
total sales reported on the COMPUSTAT tapes. We omit all firms that have
been listed for less than 5 years because of the finding in Bhattacharya,
Borisov, and Yu (2014) that “natal financial care” significantly affects
firm mortality rates during the first years after listing. The results are quali-
tatively the same when we include these firms. We also drop all three-digit
SIC industry-years with fewer than five observations, as we need to estimate
moments of the industry-wide distribution of the variables to control for
CORPORATEAGINGANDTAKEOVERRISK 2281
industry effects. The three-digit SIC granularity is the one recommended by
Giroud and Mueller (2010), among others. The results are robust to alter-
native industry definitions. The final sample consists of 10,219 firms and
83,790 firm-years.
Table I reports the number of firms that enter and leave the sample during
the 31 years under investigation. We start with 2,324 firms in 1978. Turnover
is remarkably high: 7,934 firms enter and 6,438 firms leave between 1978 and
2009. That corresponds to an annual rate of entry and exit of 9.4% and
7.7%, respectively.1 Churn is therefore substantially higher than in the
sample of Baker and Kennedy (2002). This is mostly due to the fact that
our sample includes the takeover waves of the late 1990s. The results of our
investigation remain the same if we exclude the years 1996–2000.
Table I. Turnover and exit reasons
The table distinguishes various subperiods and shows the number of sample firms at the
beginning of each period as well as the number of entering and exiting firms. The last three
columns to the right show the reasons why firms leave the sample. Using the delisting codes
reported on the CRSP tapes, we distinguish among three exit reasons: takeover, failure, and
other reasons. Failure is assumed if a firm is liquidated (delisting codes 400–490), drops
from the exchange because of bankruptcy (574), or fails to maintain an acceptable share-
price level (552) or capitalization (560 and 584), fails to file financial statements, or fails to
pay exchange fees (580). Takeovers are identified with the delisting codes 200–299. “Other”
delistings are mainly exchanges for other securities, switches to other stock exchanges, or
delistings because of an insufficient number of shareholders or market makers.
Period Firms beginning New entrants Total exits
Exit reasons
Takeover Failure Other
1978–84 2,324 1,276 788 488 107 193
1985–89 2,414 1,512 1,042 532 279 231
1990–94 2,777 1,315 834 329 387 118
1995–99 3,030 1,928 1,364 825 339 200
2000–04 3,018 1,435 1,303 606 495 202
2005–09 2,611 468 1,107 714 224 169
Total 7,934 6,438 3,494 1,831 1,113
1 Note that the sum of firms at the beginning of each subperiod plus new entries minus
exits is lower than the number of firms at the beginning of the following subperiod. The
difference is due to firms that drop out of the sample because they cease to meet our sample
selection criteria. In particular, we lose many observations because of the restriction of at
least five firms in each industry-year.
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The table also shows the exit reasons based on the delisting codes reported
in CRSP. As in Rauh (2006), among others, takeovers are transactions with
the delisting codes 200–299. We are unable to tell friendly from hostile deals.
Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001), however, show that even in the
1980s, the era of hostile takeovers, the overwhelming majority of all deals
were friendly (see also Servaes, 1991). Moreover, Schwert (2000) finds that
“hostility” is mainly motivated by strategic bargaining to extract higher
rents, and that hostile and friendly deals are mostly indistinguishable in
economic terms.
Because most of our investigation controls for competing exit risks, we
identify forms of exit other than takeover. In the case of financial failure, we
follow Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi’s (2008) broader failure definition
and define it as liquidation (400–490), bankruptcy (574), or delisting for
financial reasons. The latter category applies to firms unable to maintain
an acceptable share-price level (552) or capitalization amount (560 and 584),
or when they fail to file financial statements or pay exchange fees (580).
Other forms of exit are comparatively less frequent. The fate of these
firms is not apparent from CRSP’s delisting codes. We treat them as a
separate group in our competing hazard estimation approach. The results
are fairly robust to alternative definitions of this group.
Some of the firms that drop from the exchanges in going-private transac-
tions may list again years later, for example in a reverse leveraged buyout
(LBO). Cao and Lerner (2009) identify 526 such transactions between 1981
and 2003. Firms that relist could end up being treated as separate firms. This
could bias the results. We follow the extant literature and use Compustat’s
unique identifier (gvkey) to track companies over time in spite of name or
ticker changes and measure age from the date of incorporation. Firms typ-
ically maintain their incorporation age when they resurface as newly listed
entities. Reverse LBOs should therefore not represent a confounding event.
Most firms are taken over or merged (3,494), consistent with Baker and
Kennedy (2002). Comparatively few companies (1,831) experience financial
failure. Over the whole sample period, takeovers account for roughly 55% of
all exits, 28% are failures, and 17% are other kinds of exits. Put differently,
of all 10,219 firms present at some time in the sample during 1978–2009,
34% are taken over, 18% fail, and 11% exit for other reasons—the rest
survive.
2.2 EXIT HAZARD ANALYSIS
The first part of the analysis investigates whether a firm’s takeover risk is a
function of age. We start with a univariate analysis and then switch to a
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multivariate regression framework to control for potential confounding
effects. As mentioned in Section 1, takeover and other exit forms could be
competing hazards, a situation that could occur if firms, for example, filed
for bankruptcy to avoid takeover or if takeover served as an alternative crisis
resolution mechanism for financial failure. Ignoring competing risks can lead
to estimation bias (Powell and Yawson, 2007). We therefore investigate the
relation between firm age and takeover risk in the context of discrete-time
competing risk proportional hazard models. When doing so, we assume that
the risk of takeover conditional on the effect of the covariates in the model
(in particular profitability) is independent of the risk of financial failure and
other exit forms. The model is implemented as a pooled multinomial logistic
model (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; Jenkins, 2005), an approach that offers
the advantage that the likelihood function can be computed more easily. In
the estimation, we allow for right censoring and correct the standard errors
for heteroskedasticity as well as firm clustering. Right censoring occurs
because, at the end of the sample period, all we know is when survival
time has begun but not when exit (if any) occurs.
Our takeover hazard model includes a broad range of control variables
that have been found to correlate with takeover hazard, namely:
Variable Description Expected sign
Sales growth Relative change in real sales ?
MTB equity Market value of equity divided by its book value. ?
Cash Cash and short-term investments divided by the book
value assets
?/þ
Debt ratio Book value of debt divided by market assets ?/–
Profitability Net income divided by lagged total assets –
Excess return Market-adjusted stock return over the previous year –
Tangibility Property, plant, and equipment divided by book assets þ
Size Log of the market value of assets –
Focus Herfindahl index of the firm’s segment sales þ
MTB similarity The fraction of other firms in the same three-digit SIC
industry with a similar MTB equity ratio
þ
Product similarity The total product similarity score from Hoberg and
Phillips (2010)
þ
Size similarity The fraction of other firms in the same three-digit SIC
industry with a similar market capitalization
þ
Industry concentration Herfindahl index of the sales of all firms in the same three-
digit SIC industry
–
Takeover intensity The number of other firms in the same three-digit SIC
industry that delist due to takeover, divided by the
number of other firms in that industry
þ
GDP growth The relative change in the real US gross domestic product
in any given year
þ
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The precise definition of these variables is in Table AI. Sales growth,
equity market-to-book ratios, cash holdings, and debt ratios reflect growth
opportunities as well as potential imbalances between growth and available
resources (see, e.g., Palepu, 1986). Their effect cannot be signed a priori.
Large cash holdings and low debt levels could also be proxies for free cash
flow problems, which could attract takeover (Jensen, 1986). Profitability and
excess return are related to management efficiency and reduce takeover
threat (Jensen, 1988; Scharfstein, 1988). Asset tangibility increases borrow-
ing capacity and, therefore, should invite takeover. Large (Palepu, 1986) and
diversified (Agarwal and Gort, 1996, 1999, 2002) firms should face lower
takeover risk. Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2008) show that merger trans-
actions are more likely to occur between firm with similar characteristics.
Similar valuation multiples should therefore invite takeover, and so should
the presence of firms with similar size and product lines (see also Hoberg and
Phillips, 2010). Many of these variables are proxies for merger synergies.
Finally, higher competition and greater takeover activity should increase
takeover threat (Kole and Lehn, 1997, 1999) and so should an expanding
economy.
To investigate takeover in the context of competing hazards, we have to
also investigate failure hazards. To do so, we augment the takeover hazard
model by two additional variables that, according to Bharath and Shumway
(2008), drive financial failure hazards, namely:
Variable Description Expected sign
Naı¨ve PD The “naı¨ve” default probability implied by Merton’s (1974) model þ
1/Volatility The inverse of the standard deviation of return on the firm’s stock –
Throughout the analysis, all regression arguments are lagged by 1 year,
since exit presumably reacts to its determining factors with a lag. Moreover,
to control for industry- and period-specific effects, we standardize all firm-
specific variables by industry and year. In other words, we deduct the three-
digit SIC industry average and divide by the industry standard deviation in
any given year. The exceptions in this standardization are the variables
related to company age and Merton model’s “naı¨ve” default probability.
Standardized variables are denoted with the prefix s-. When interpreting
the evidence, it is important to remember this adjustment. The results
remain qualitatively the same when we include industry and year-fixed
effects instead of standardizing the control variables. Binary variables
have the prefix b-.
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Duration dependence could be induced by unobserved heterogeneity in
exit hazards (e.g., Zorn, 2000). If the exit hazards of firms are conditionally
different in ways we do not account for, the mean hazard rate could decline
with cohort age because the sample becomes increasingly composed of firms
with the lowest exit risk, and not because exit risk declines with age (see also
Thompson, 2005). To address this concern, we also estimate discrete time
proportional hazard regressions with the Prentice and Gloeckler (1978)
model, which incorporates a gamma mixture distribution to summarize un-
observed individual heterogeneity, as well as with the Heckman and Singer
(1984) procedure that incorporates a discrete mixture distribution to sum-
marize unobserved individual heterogeneity.
2.3 VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
Our main variable of interest is firm age, measured as the number of years
(plus one) elapsed since the year of incorporation (Age). Information about
the firm’s incorporation age is partly from Jay Ritter’s website and partly
hand-collected from Mergent Webreports. We rely on the firm’s incorpor-
ation age because firms are subject to exit risk from the day they start. The
results remain essentially unchanged when we focus on listing age instead
(not tabulated).
Table AII in the Appendix shows average incorporation age and, for
comparison, listing age. In the full sample, average listing age is 17 years
and average incorporation age is 34 years (the median values are 13 and 25,
respectively). Average incorporation age at the time of listing varies substan-
tially over time (see also Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2001; Fink et al., 2010).
To reduce the influence of outliers, we winsorize all continuous and un-
bounded control variables at the 1st and 99th percentile of their pooled
distribution. All variables are measured at year end. Variable definitions
are in Table AI and descriptive statistics are in Table AII.
3. Firm Age and Takeover Hazard
3.1 SINGLE-DESTINATION MODELS
To investigate the relation between firm age and takeover hazard, we start by
estimating kernel-weighted local polynomial regressions, a nonparametric
technique that helps us identify an unspecified relation between firm age
and takeover risk. Figure 1 plots the results of this analysis. The shaded
area shows the 90% confidence interval. To limit the impact of outliers at
higher age, we truncate the sample at incorporation age 75 years, the 90th-
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percentile of the age distribution, an approach also used by Agarwal and
Gort (2002). The results of the estimation imply that takeover hazard
declines over time. At young age, it is around 4.5%, whereas at old age it
is only around 2.5%. This corresponds to a decline by more than 40%.
Takeover hazard seems to rebound slightly around age 40 years, but the
increase is not statistically significant.
Table II estimates single destination regressions for takeover hazard that
control for unobserved heterogeneity. The first three regressions are
univariate. The results imply that the negative age dependence of takeover
hazard is robust to unobserved heterogeneity. In Regression 1, we estimate
the Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) model that incorporates a gamma mixture
distribution to summarize unobserved firm heterogeneity (Meyer, 1990). In
that regression, age takes on a negative and significant coefficient. The same
result obtains in Regression 2, where we incorporate a discrete mixture dis-
tribution to summarize unobserved heterogeneity, as suggested by Heckman
and Singer (1984). Finally, Regression 3 shows that the coefficient of age is
essentially unchanged when we estimate a proportional hazard model that
ignores unobserved heterogeneity.
Figure 1. The relation between age and exit risk. The figure reports unconditional kernel-
weighted local polynomial regressions for takeover risks as a function of firm age, using an
Epanechnikov kernel function with a “rule-of-thumb” bandwidth estimator and local-mean
smoothing. The shaded area shows the 90% confidence interval.
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Table II. Company age and takeover hazard
The table investigates the relation between firm age and takeover hazard with discrete-time
proportional hazard models. Variable definitions are in Table AI. Regressions 1–3 are
univariate whereas Regressions 4–6 incorporate the control variables for takeover risk. In
Regressions 1, 4, and 5, we estimate Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) discrete-time propor-
tional hazard models incorporating a gamma mixture distribution to summarize unobserved
firm heterogeneity (Meyer, 1990). Regressions 2 and 6 estimate Heckman and Singer (1984)
models that incorporate a discrete mixture distribution to summarize unobserved hetero-
geneity (Jenkins, 2005). Finally, for comparison, Regression 3 estimates a discrete-time
proportional hazard model that ignores unobserved heterogeneity. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. The symbol *** indicates significance at
the 1% two-tailed level, respectively.
Prentice and
Gloeckler (1978)
Heckman and
Singer (1984)
No control for
unobserved
heterogeneity
Prentice and
Gloeckler (1978) Heckman and
Singer (1984)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Age) 0.179*** 0.179*** 0.181*** 0.145*** 0.145***
(0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.036) (0.032)
s Sales growth 0.119*** 0.118*** 0.118***
(0.021) (0.024) (0.024)
s MTB equity 0.086*** 0.093*** 0.093***
(0.025) (0.028) (0.028)
s Cash 0.058*** 0.074*** 0.074***
(0.021) (0.024) (0.024)
s Debt ratio 0.001 0.012 0.013
(0.021) (0.024) (0.024)
s Profitability 0.069*** 0.079*** 0.079***
(0.022) (0.026) (0.026)
s Excess return 0.102*** 0.097*** 0.097***
(0.018) (0.020) (0.020)
s Tangibility 0.024 0.019 0.019
(0.020) (0.023) (0.023)
s Size 0.100*** 0.139*** 0.139***
(0.028) (0.034) (0.033)
s Focus 0.135*** 0.114*** 0.114***
(0.021) (0.024) (0.024)
s Size similarity 0.173*** 0.202*** 0.202***
(0.028) (0.032) (0.032)
s MTB similarity 0.136*** 0.144*** 0.144***
(0.022) (0.025) (0.025)
Product similarity 0.141*** 0.144*** 0.144***
(0.027) (0.037) (0.030)
Industry concentration 0.345*** 0.523*** 0.523***
(0.130) (0.159) (0.155)
Takeover intensity 2.264*** 2.803*** 2.804***
(0.310) (0.345) (0.345)
GDP growth 7.335*** 6.487*** 6.486***
(1.011) (1.187) (1.178)
Constant 2.661*** 2.662*** 2.651*** 4.207*** 3.811*** 3.811***
(0.094) (0.117) (0.089) (0.163) (0.289) (0.238)
Number of observations 69,982 69,982 69,982 74,131 63,007 63,007
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Next, we investigate whether time-varying firm and market characteristics
are responsible for the age effects we observe. We do so by adding the set of
control variables that we discussed above to our regression specification.
Regression 4 focuses on the various control variables and omits firm age.
The estimates from the Prentice–Gloeckler model imply that takeover risk is
lower for firms with better growth (s Sales growth), higher valuation (s MTB
equity), and larger cash holdings (s Cash). Contrary to the hypothesis that
takeover disciplines poorly performing firms, however, we find that takeover
hazard is actually higher for firms with stronger operating performance (s
Profitability) and stronger stock market performance (s Excess return). We
are, however, controlling for other dimensions of profitability such as sales
growth, which could explain this finding. The positive correlation with stock
market performance is consistent with Baker and Kennedy (2002), who show
that the stock of takeover targets performs particularly well in the year prior
to takeover, an indication that market participants suspect the firm is in
play. The fact that focus has a positive coefficient could mean that acquirers
prefer pure players. In line with the “like-buys-like” hypothesis proposed by
Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2008) and the finding of Hoberg and Phillips
(2010) that mergers are more likely to occur between partners with similar
products, the coefficients of the three similarity measures Product similarity,
s Size similarity, and s MTB similarity are all positive and highly significant.
The positive coefficient of Takeover intensity is consistent with the notion
that mergers occur in waves (see, e.g., Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996). As for
the positive coefficient associated with stronger economic growth, it suggests
that the reallocation of resources via merger is livelier during boom phases of
the economy. Not surprisingly, that reallocation is also more vigorous in less
concentrated and hence potentially more competitive industries. Size is posi-
tively related with takeover risk whereas leverage and asset tangibility are
statistically zero.
Regressions 5 and 6 show that, when we include the control variables in
the univariate regression specifications of the first two columns, firm age
maintains its negative and significant coefficient, regardless of the assumed
form of unobserved heterogeneity. The coefficient of age remains statistically
unchanged. As it turns out, that coefficient remains the same also when we
do not control for unobserved heterogeneity (not shown).
In unreported estimations, we find that hazard rates decline with age re-
gardless of the functional form we choose for that relation. We use alterna-
tively: 1/(1þAge), the age metric proposed by Pastor and Veronesi (2003);
Age and Age2; and the binary variable, b Old, that identifies firms older than
the sample median in any given year.
CORPORATEAGINGANDTAKEOVERRISK 2289
3.2 COMPETING RISK REGRESSIONS
As mentioned above, single destination models can produce biased estimates
if the exit risks are competing. To prevent that we reassess the age-depend-
ence of takeover risk in the context of competing risk regressions. We allow
for the three exit routes from Table I. The dependent variable is therefore
equal to 0 if the firm survives (the base outcome), 1 if it is taken over, 2 if it
fails, and 3 if it exits for other reasons. The category “other reasons” is
included for econometric purposes and is not reported separately in any of
the following tables. The regression arguments are the same as in Table II,
augmented, since we are extending the analysis to failure risk, by the two
variables Naı¨ve PD and 1/Volatility discussed in Section 2.2.
Table III shows the results. For comparison purposes, the first regression
specification focuses on firm age and excludes all control variables. Models 2
and 3 then study the age-dependence of exit risk conditional on the various
control variables and with different age measures. As one can see, switching
from single destination models to competing risk regressions does not
change the relation between firm age and takeover risk. The age coefficients
are statistically identical to the ones from the single destination models.
Therefore, competing exit risks do not seem to be of major concern for
our investigation. For the same reason, neither is unobserved heterogeneity.
The coefficients of the control variables also remain unchanged. In par-
ticular, the coefficient of the standardized MTB equity variable is still
negative and significant throughout. This suggests that firms that are
priced at the upper end of the valuation spectrum in their industry, and
therefore firms that tend to be perceived as being overpriced, are less
likely to be taken over. Overpricing does not have to be a fact, it could
simply be an opinion of financial analysts, business analysts, and investment
bankers who are active in the M&A market. Since the coefficient of age is
always negative and significant in spite of controlling for MTB ratios, the
evidence implies that perceived overpricing is not the reason for the negative
age-dependence of takeover hazard. None of the two new control variables,
Naı¨ve PD and 1/Volatility, has coefficients that are different from zero at
conventional levels of significance.
Appendix B conducts extensive tests of whether individual omitted vari-
ables or different coefficients of the control variables between young and
mature firms could be responsible for the negative age-dependence of
takeover hazard. We examine firm size, potential imbalances between
growth opportunities and available resources, inefficient investment
policies, age of managers and directors, management talent, and industry
age. None of them can explain the dependence in question.
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Table III. Company age and competing exit risks
The table estimates pooled multinomial logit regressions with standard errors corrected for
heteroskedasticity and firm clustering. We distinguish between takeover and failure hazard
as well as other exit reasons (not reported). Model 1 is univariate. In Models 2 and 3, we
add the control variables and use two different measures of age: ln(Age) in Regression 2;
and the old-firm dummy (b Old) in Regression 3. Standard errors are clustered at the firm
level and reported in parentheses. Variable definitions are in Table AI. The symbols ***, **,
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% two-tailed level, respectively.
M-Logit 1 M-Logit 2 M-Logit 3
Takeover Failure Takeover Failure Takeover Failure
ln(Age) 0.207*** 0.739*** 0.148*** 0.205***
(0.031) (0.044) (0.037) (0.053)
b Old 0.123** 0.159**
(0.050) (0.073)
Naı¨ve PD 0.202 2.191*** 0.188 2.211***
(0.145) (0.139) (0.144) (0.138)
s Size 0.085** 0.757*** 0.073* 0.774***
(0.038) (0.059) (0.038) (0.058)
s Debt ratio 0.043 0.076* 0.044 0.072*
(0.029) (0.039) (0.029) (0.040)
s 1/Volatility 0.013 0.345*** 0.022 0.348***
(0.032) (0.064) (0.032) (0.063)
s Excess return 0.103*** 0.317*** 0.102*** 0.317***
(0.021) (0.040) (0.021) (0.040)
s Profitability 0.039 0.503*** 0.038 0.509***
(0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030)
s Sales growth 0.115*** 0.118*** 0.109*** 0.110***
(0.027) (0.032) (0.027) (0.032)
s MTB equity 0.070** 0.011 0.068** 0.015
(0.031) (0.026) (0.031) (0.026)
s Cash 0.099*** 0.274*** 0.096*** 0.269***
(0.029) (0.049) (0.029) (0.049)
s Tangibility 0.016 0.028 0.016 0.026
(0.025) (0.034) (0.025) (0.034)
s Focus 0.109*** 0.031 0.115*** 0.037
(0.028) (0.039) (0.028) (0.039)
s Size similarity 0.166*** 0.065 0.166*** 0.063
(0.036) (0.078) (0.036) (0.078)
s MTB similarity 0.113*** 0.302*** 0.112*** 0.305***
(0.028) (0.034) (0.028) (0.034)
Product similarity 0.176*** 0.201*** 0.193*** 0.217***
(0.035) (0.053) (0.035) (0.052)
Industry concentration 0.443*** 0.248 0.466*** 0.274
(0.171) (0.249) (0.172) (0.250)
Takeover intensity 2.799*** 0.592 2.806*** 0.590
(0.365) (0.674) (0.362) (0.669)
GDP growth 4.068*** 6.490*** 4.103*** 6.239***
(1.440) (1.960) (1.426) (1.942)
(continued)
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3.3 THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF AGE ON SURVIVAL
We can use the coefficient estimates of Model 2 in Table III to predict the
marginal contribution of age to takeover hazard and assess the economic
significance of that relation. Table IV performs the analysis. All variables
except for ln(Age) are kept at their average sample value. The first line of
the table shows predicted takeover hazards at age 5 (ln(Age)¼ 1.6094). The
second line shows predicted takeover hazards at the median age of 25
(ln(Age)¼ 3.2189). The average difference is 0.93% points. This repre-
sents a 19% reduction in takeover hazard. The lower bound on the 95%
confidence interval corresponds to a relative decline of 32% in takeover
hazard. Hence, the effect of company age appears to be economically
palpable.
Table III. Continued
M-Logit 1 M-Logit 2 M-Logit 3
Takeover Failure Takeover Failure Takeover Failure
Constant 2.490*** 1.461*** 3.844*** 5.539*** 4.357*** 6.213***
(0.103) (0.134) (0.267) (0.386) (0.218) (0.324)
Observations 53,107 53,107 53,107
Pseudo R2 0.008 0.196 0.196
Table IV. The economic impact of company age on takeover exit hazard
The table shows predicted takeover hazards from Model 2 of Table III. All variables except
for ln(Age) are kept at their average value. The first line of the table shows predicted
takeover hazard at incorporation age 5 (ln(Age)¼ 1.6094). The second line of the table
shows predicted takeover hazard at incorporation age 25 (ln(Age)¼ 3.2189).
Takeover hazard
Age¼ 5 4.79%
Age¼ 25 3.86%
Difference 3.864.79¼0.93%
Standard error of difference 0.30%
Left-hand side interval limit –0.932 0.30¼1.53%
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3.4 SEARCH COSTS AS A POSSIBLE EXPLANATION
A possible interpretation of the negative age-dependence of takeover risk is
that mature firms have fewer potential merger partners.2 Searching for
merger partners is costly, which could induce firms to search only a part
of the universe of potential targets each year. Once a firm has been screened
by a potential acquirer and dismissed as a suitable takeover candidate, it will
not be reconsidered by that potential acquirer in the future. Older firms
could therefore face smaller takeover odds simply because they randomly
passed the screening by potential acquirers and face a progressively smaller
residual pool of potential acquirers. The problem with this interpretation is
that, as we saw, the number of new entries and exits of listed firms every year
is substantial, on average. Hence, the pool of potential merger partners does
not necessarily decline. Moreover, the observed negative age-dependence of
takeover hazard is conditional on, and therefore orthogonal to the standard
proxies for merger synergies. Thus, arguments that ultimately rely on those
synergies do not seem to be able to explain the takeover hazard pattern in
question.
For a more direct test, we look for measures of search costs. Rhodes-
Kropf and Robinson (2008) argue that search frictions are lower when li-
quidity in the capital markets and valuation levels are high. Following these
authors, we use the commercial and industrial loan rates spread over the
intended Federal funds rate as a proxy for market liquidity (C&I spread),
and a binary variable that identifies industries with historically high valu-
ation levels as a proxy for industries with high valuation (b High valuation).
Regression 1 of Table V adds these variables to the hazard model from
Table III (M-Logit 2), our standard regression model. If search frictions
were responsible for the negative sensitivity of takeover hazard to age, we
would expect the coefficient of ln(Age) to decline in size. We find that the
coefficient does indeed decline numerically from 0.148 to 0.129. The change,
however, is statistically zero. In untabulated regressions, we split the sample
into high and low search cost periods according to our two proxies. The
search-costs hypothesis would predict that the age effect is significantly
lower at times of low search costs. However, the evidence does not
support that prediction.
Another way to test the search-cost hypothesis is to distinguish between
incorporation and listing age. As a result of better disclosure, the search
process for takeover candidates should run its course only when the firm
2 We are grateful to the referee for pointing out this interpretation of the evidence as well
as its empirical test.
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is publicly traded. As a consequence, incorporation age at listing should be
unrelated with takeover hazard, whereas listing age should have a negative
coefficient. According to Regression 2 of Table V, however, both age
measures are negatively and significantly related with takeover risk, even
though the coefficient of Listing age is numerically twice as large as the
coefficient of Age at listing.
Overall, we therefore conclude that search-cost considerations might
affect the probability of takeover but they seem unable to explain the
negative age-dependence of takeover hazards.
3.5 PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS
Contrary to the initial expectations, we find a robust, statistically, and eco-
nomically significant negative relation between firm age and takeover
Table V. A search-cost explanation of declining takeover hazard
The table extends the hazard Model 2 from Table III with measures of search costs.
Regression 1 adds a proxy for market liquidity (C&I spread) and a binary variable that
identifies industries with high valuation (b High valuation). Regression 2 splits the firms’
incorporation age into Age at listing and Listing age. Regression 3 includes all four
additional variables at the same time. To preserve space, we do not report the coefficients
of the control variables. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in
parentheses. Variable definitions are in Table AI. The symbols *** and ** indicate signifi-
cance at the 1% and 5% two-tailed level, respectively.
Takeover hazard
(1) (2) (3)
b Old 0.129**
(0.050)
C&I spread 0.614*** 0.615***
(0.090) (0.092)
b High valuation 0.034 0.027
(0.046) (0.047)
Age at listing 0.003** 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001)
Listing age 0.006** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.002)
Controls Included Included Included
Observations 53,107 50,991 50,991
Pseudo R2 0.235 0.197 0.236
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hazard, even after controlling for variables that other papers typically
control for. A number of omitted variables could have caused this finding,
but none of those we examine can explain the results. Our proxies for
search costs cannot explain that relation either. If mature firms are
comparatively less frequently involved in takeovers, it must ultimately be
because their managers resist takeover or because they are comparatively
costly to integrate. The rest of the paper is dedicated to testing these two
hypotheses.
4. Agency Problems and Declining Takeover Hazards
Murphy (1997) and Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004), among others,
document that the managers of target firms often lose their jobs in the
aftermath of an acquisition. This prospect could be particularly threatening
to the managers of older organizations, since the specialization process that
these firms engage in (Loderer, Stulz, and Waelchli, 2014) could gradually
reduce the value of their outside employment opportunities. If so, these
managers will try to protect their quasi-rents and their internal career
opportunities and enjoy a quieter life. They could do so by raising formal
antitakeover barriers in the form of antitakeover provisions (ATPs) in the
corporate charter and the corporate bylaws. ATPs make takeovers more
expensive.3
In what follows, we test whether that is the case. We also test whether
mature firms are also less inclined to give their managers golden parachutes
to encourage resistance against mergers and acquisitions.
4.1 STRUCTURAL TAKEOVER DEFENSES IN OLDER FIRMS
In principle, poison pills are the most formidable defense against takeover
there is. Ever since the Delaware Supreme Court declared that pills are le-
gitimate in 1985, almost all firms can adopt one very quickly even after a
takeover bid has been made (Coates, 2000). Almost all companies therefore
have a “shadow pill” readily available. In fact, almost all firms have charter
provisions already in place authorizing blank check preferred stock, “the
3 The literature offers two reasons for the presence of ATPs. Both are predicated under the
argument that they make takeovers more expensive. Under the first explanation, entrenched
managers use them to fend off takeover (Comment and Schwert, 1995; Field and Karpoff,
2002; Core et al., 2006). According to the second explanation, ATPs confer management
better bargaining power in merger negotiations (DeAngelo and Rice, 1983; Grossman and
Hart, 1988).
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most common source of the securities used to create a poison pill,” when
they go public (Daines and Klausner, 2001, pp. 114–115). The shadow pill
has made other defenses, such as fair price and supermajority vote provi-
sions, unimportant (Coates, 2000). Yet it only takes a board decision to
repeal a poison pill. Hence, to be an effective defense mechanism, a poison
pill has to be accompanied by provisions that make it difficult for the
bidding party to replace an incumbent board.
Following Daines and Klausner (2001), we therefore examine the presence
of ATPs that can “delay a hostile bid above and beyond the ubiquitous pill”
(p. 88): dual-class stock, staggered board, and inability of shareholders to act
by written consent or to call a special meeting. We also examine the existence
of actual poison pills and blank check preferred stock authorizations. Even
though the shadow pill is ubiquitous, pills that are in place or ostensibly
readily deployable could signal the intention to resist takeover. As men-
tioned, we also test whether mature firms are less likely to grant their
managers golden parachutes. Data on governance provisions are from
Risk Metrics.
4.2 ANTITAKEOVER PROTECTION AT OLD AGE
The first column in Table VI reports the popularity of the various
antitakeover devices. Because Risk Metrics starts in 1990, the sample
period is 1990–2009. More than 90% of all firms have either a poison pill
or a blank check preferred stock authorization in place. This is comparable
with what Daines and Klausner (2001) report for their IPO firms. About
10% of the sample firms have multiple classes of stock, almost 60% have
staggered boards (mostly in combination with pills or blank check preferred
stock), and almost 40% have voting restrictions. Golden parachutes are
granted in about 60% of the cases.
To test whether old firms are more likely to erect takeover barriers, we
estimate logistic regressions in which the dependent variable equals 1 if a
given firm adopts or removes a particular ATP in any given year, and
equals 0 otherwise. Firms that have a specific provision in place are
excluded from the analysis of adoptions; conversely, those that do not
have a given provision are excluded from the analysis of removals. The
regression arguments include the old firm dummy (b Old) and the set of
control variables from Table II. To preserve space, we report only the
coefficient of company age (second section of Table VI). Overall, we
find little evidence that older firms beef up their structural takeover
defenses. If anything, the opposite is true. Older firms are less likely to
put poison pills in place, and more inclined to remove staggered boards
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and to dismantle the combination of staggered boards and poison pills.
They also tend to eliminate voting restrictions. There is, however, some
evidence of less frequent adoption of golden parachutes in older firms. Yet,
overall, we conclude that there is little evidence that older firms boost their
structural takeover defenses over time.
Table VI. Company age and formal takeover defenses
The table investigates the relation between firm age and corporate ATPs. ‘Company age
and takeover defenses’ examines the popularity of each provision (Sample mean). The
governance variables are provided by IRRC on a bi- or triannual basis, starting in 1990.
To increase sample size, we interpolate those variables for missing sample years. ‘Frequency
of changes in antitakeover protection’ lists the frequency of changes in governance provi-
sions and investigates whether these changes are related with firm age, conditional on the
control variables. The dependent variables in those regressions are binary variables that
measure whether a given provision was added or removed in a given year, respectively.
Firms that have a specific provision in place are excluded in the column labeled Adoptions;
those that do not have it are excluded in the column labeled Removals. The control vari-
ables are obtained from Table II. Variable definitions are in Table AI. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% two-tailed level, respectively.
Company age and takeover defenses
Sample mean
b Dual class 0.097
b Staggered board 0.565
b Pill 0.917
b Staggered board and b Pill 0.537
b Voting restriction 0.354
b Golden parachute 0.572
Frequency of changes in antitakeover protection
Provisions
Adoptions Removals
Firm Years
Observations
Coefficient
b Old Observations
Coefficient
b Old
Dual class 21 – 44 – 12,060
Staggered board 72 0.061 111 0.733** 12,060
Pill 57 0.597* 32 0.661 12,060
Staggered board and Pill 87 0.055 113 1.047*** 12,060
Voting restriction 396 0.040 248 0.671*** 12,039
Golden parachute 674 0.203* 424 0.272** 12,023
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5. Declining Takeover Risk and the Integration Costs of Older Firms
The remaining interpretation of the negative age-dependence of takeover
hazard is that a takeover is not believed to create sufficient value to justify
the subsequent integration costs. Holmstrom (1989) argues that mature firms
primarily serve production and marketing goals. To pursue these goals, they
rationally depend on incentive mechanisms and organizational rules and best
practice that induce organizational rigidities. Since it takes time to imple-
ment and optimize these rules and arrangements, they will correlate with
company age. And since they are difficult to unwind, they will make mature
firms more costly to integrate into different organizations and therefore, all
else the same, less likely to be acquired.
We conduct two tests of this integration costs hypothesis. First, we inves-
tigate whether adverse exogenous shocks to the expected merger benefits
lead to a more negative age-dependence of takeover hazards. Second, and
more important, we look for proxies for rigidities and test whether they
explain the age effect we observe.
5.1 EXOGENOUS ECONOMIC SHOCKS AND TAKEOVER RISK
If old firms are unattractive merger partners because they are more costly to
integrate, we would expect their merger appeal to be particularly low at times
of industry distress. This prediction follows from a simple cost-benefit
analysis of mergers. Whereas the expected benefits of a merger of two
firms depend positively on business conditions, the integration costs
associated with that transaction would seem to be more or less constant.
At times of industry distress, deals that entail high integration costs should
therefore become especially rare because the expected benefits are more
likely to fall below the integration costs. If firm age is a proxy for integration
costs, we would therefore expect that industry distress lowers the takeover
risk of mature firms further. To find out, we replicate the competing exit risk
models of Table III and test whether industry distress does indeed further
reduce the takeover hazard of mature firms.
We follow Opler and Titman (1994) and Gopalan and Xie (2011), among
others, and classify an industry as distressed if its median sales growth is
negative and its median stock return is below 30% in any given year.
Industry distress is quite infrequent and occurs in approximately only 4%
of all industry-years. Table VII shows the results of the analysis. The first
regression specification extends the competing risk regression of Model 3 in
Table III with a binary variable that identifies firm years in distressed
industries, b Industry distress, and an interaction term of that variable
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Table VII. Takeover hazard, firm age, and exogenous adverse industry shocks
The table asks how industry distress affects exit risk at old age. As in Opler and Titman
(1994) and Gopalan and Xie (2011), among others, an industry is assumed to be in distress
if median sales growth is negative and median stock return is below 30% in any given
year. Distressed industries are identified with the binary variable bIndustry distress.
Regression 1 of ‘M-logit estimates’ adds bIndustry distress as well as an interaction term
with the old-firm dummy to the standard competing risk regression Model 3 from Table III.
Regression 2 estimates the standard competing risk regression in the subsample of firms
that operate in distressed industries. To preserve space, we do not report the coefficients of
the control variables. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in
parentheses. Variable definitions are in Table AI. ‘Norton, Wang, and Ai (2004) interaction
terms for Regression 1’ re-estimates the interaction terms from Model 1 of ‘M-logit esti-
mates’ using the procedure suggested by Norton, Wang, and Ai (2004). The symbols ***
and ** indicate significance at the 1% and 5% two-tailed level, respectively.
M-logit estimates
Full sample Distressed industries
Regression 1 Regression 2
Takeover Failure Takeover Failure
b Old 0.107** 0.223*** 0.995*** 0.835***
(0.051) (0.077) (0.364) (0.291)
b Industry distress 0.004 0.302
(0.178) (0.188)
b Oldb Industry distress 0.754** 0.795***
(0.332) (0.268)
Other controls Included Included
Observations 53,107 1,712
Pseudo R2 0.197 0.226
Norton, Wang, and Ai (2004) interaction terms for Regression 1
Takeover hazard Failure hazard
Average interaction effect 0.02 0.02
Min; Max interaction effect 0.099; 0.003 0.000; 0.196
Estimated z-statistics
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with the old-firm dummy, b Old. Under this specification, the coefficient of b
Old remains negative and significant for both hazards. More important,
however, the interaction term b Old b Industry distress has a negative
and significant coefficient in the takeover regression, consistent with the
prediction that hard times for the industry overall further reduce the
takeover hazard of older firms. The implied takeover hazard of an older
firm drops by 50% at times of industry distress (from 3.60% to 1.80%),
whereas that of a young firm is unaffected (4.10% versus 4.11%). Note that
industry distress per se does not seem to affect takeover risk.4 The estimation
and interpretation of interaction terms in nonlinear models is not straight-
forward. For completeness, we therefore also follow the procedure suggested
by Norton, Wang, and Ai (2004) and estimate a separate interaction effect
for each observation using a logit specification. The second section of Table
VII shows the results. The average interaction effect is the same as in the first
section (1.8%). Moreover, the estimated interaction effects are always
negative and significant with confidence 0.9 or better. Therefore, we
conclude that old age is indeed associated with lower takeover risk at
times of industry distress.
In the second regression specification of the table’s first section, we restrict
our attention to firms in distressed industries. We therefore drop the b
Industry distress variable and its interaction term, and estimate the model
for firms in distressed industries. The age coefficient is negative and signifi-
cant in the case of takeover hazard. Furthermore, and consistent with the
prediction of the integration costs hypothesis, it is significantly more
negative than in normal times.
5.2 FIRM AGE, RIGIDITIES, AND TAKEOVER RISK
If higher merger integration costs of old firms are driven by the accumulation
of rigidities over time, we should observe that mature firms show more
symptoms of rigidity, that rigidities deter takeover, and that they explain at
least part of the negative age-related decline in takeover hazard. To test these
predictions, we identified four possible rigidity measures. Various firms, not
only mature ones, have these characteristics. However, they should be typical
of the average mature firm. What follows first discusses the rigidity proxies
and then tests their impact on the relation between firm age and takeover risk.
4 The results remain qualitatively the same if we add interaction terms of all control vari-
ables with b Old.
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5.2.a Rigidity measures
The rigidities we focus on relate to the firm’s cost structure, its investment
policy, product portfolio, and organizational structure. The rationale for
these rigidities is as follows (the proxies we use are described in Appendix A):
(1) Cost rigidities: Anderson, Banker, and Janakiraman (2003) report that
overhead expenses are more sensitive to increases than to decreases in
sales. The reason is the costs of reestablishing production capacity fol-
lowing a reduction. Firms are therefore reluctant to cut overhead when
demand declines, because the decline could be only temporary. In our
sample, a 1% decline in sales is associated with only a 0.5% decrease in
overhead expenses. Anderson, Banker, and Janakiraman (2003) report
similar numbers. If they are indeed inflexible, mature firms should be
particularly unable to cut costs when demand declines.
(2) Investment rigidities: A rigid investment policy implies that firms fail to
respond to positive NPV investment opportunities.
(3) Product portfolio rigidities: Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala (2014)
provide measures of product fluidity based on the product description
in the firms’ 10-K. They show that the product mix of old firms is more
stable than that of young firms. Our proxy for product rigidities is the
negative value of the Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala (2014) fluidity
measure.
(4) Organizational rigidities: Geographically dispersed organizations are
more complex (Denis, Denis, and Yost, 2002; Bushman et al., 2004)
and consequently more impervious to change. A binary variable that
identifies firms with multinational activities is our proxy for organiza-
tional rigidities.
The first section of Table VIII reports summary statistics for the various
rigidity measures, sorted by age quartiles. The numbers show that rigidities
increase monotonically with age. The two columns on the right-hand side of
the panel show this formally with mean comparison and proportion tests.
Regardless of measure, old firms have significantly higher rigidity scores.
5.2.b Rigidities and takeover risk
To test whether rigidities are responsible for the negative age-dependence of
takeover risk, we extend the standard hazard model from Table III (M-Logit
2) with our rigidity measures. The second section of Table VIII shows the
results. As expected, the presence of rigidities lowers the takeover hazard.
Individually, all four rigidity proxies have a statistically significant
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coefficient (Regressions 1–5). However, firm age (b Old) maintains its
negative and significant coefficient in most regressions. The exception is
the regression involving product rigidities (Regression 3), where firm age is
only marginally significant in a one-sided test against zero. A potential
Table VIII. Firm age, rigidities, and takeover risk
The table investigates whether rigidities can explain the age effect on takeover hazard.
‘Summary statistics’ reports average rigidity scores sorted by age quartile and performs
comparison tests. We report z-statistics from proportion tests for the binary rigidity
measures (prefix -b) ant t-statistics from mean comparison tests for the continuous
rigidity measure. ‘Hazard model estimates’ replicates the standard competing risk regression
Model 3 from Table III for the subsample of firms with data on the rigidity measures. To
save space, we do not report the coefficients of the control variables. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. The symbols *** and ** indicate
significance at the 1% and 5% two-tailed level, respectively.
Summary statistics
Age quartiles
Q4 versus Q1
(Q3&4) versus
(Q1&2)Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
b Rigid costs 0.191 0.196 0.197 0.210 3.96*** 2.50**
b Rigid investments 0.275 0.361 0.402 0.405 23.37*** 23.09***
Product stability 8.296 7.521 6.267 5.045 61.19*** 58.88***
b Multinational 0.150 0.205 0.249 0.382 47.03*** 39.59***
Hazard model estimates
Takeover hazard
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
b Old 0.207*** 0.166*** 0.093 0.138*** –0.155*** –0.078 –0.080 –0.098
(0.057) (0.056) (0.069) (0.052) (0.053) (0.078) (0.053) (0.077)
b Rigid costs –0.213*** –0.216** –0.195***
(0.074) (0.105) (0.074)
b Rigid investments –0.119** –0.214*** –0.169***
(0.054) (0.075) (0.054)
Product rigidities –0.035*** –0.043***
(0.013) (0.014)
Product rigidities 2 –0.048*** –0.036***
(0.012) (0.011)
b Multinational –0.126** –0.120 –0.138**
(0.063) (0.090) (0.063)
Nondisclosure dummies Included Included
Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
N 42,775 44,744 22,099 51,101 46,591 17,562 51,101 17,562
Pseudo R2 0.203 0.204 0.280 0.199 0.229 0.298 0.233 0.296
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concern with this regression is the number of observations because data from
Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala (2014) are available only for the sample
period 1996–2009. To address this concern, we proceed as follows.
Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala (2014) report that product fluidity is
highly correlated with industry concentration, firm value, risk, profitability,
and research and development expenditures. We therefore regress Product
rigidities on these variables as well as industry-fixed effects, and use the
coefficient estimates from that regression to generate fitted values for the
missing sample years. With an adjusted R2 of 0.46, the explanatory power of
the regression is sizable. Based on this information, we then define an alter-
native rigidity measure, Product rigidities 2, which equals the fitted values
from the regression if data for Product rigidities are unavailable, otherwise it
equals the value of Product rigidities. Regression 4 of the second section
adds this variable to the hazard model, along with a binary variable that
flags fitted values (nondisclosure dummy). The coefficient of Product
rigidities 2 is statistically the same as that of Product rigidities in
Regression 3 for the limited sample. With this specification, the coefficient
of age is still negative and significant. It is, however, numerically smaller
than in the regressions involving the other rigidity proxies.
The rigidity proxies are therefore unable, individually, to fully explain the
age effect we observe. To examine their joint effect, we include them all at
the same time. Regression 6 shows the results for the subsample of 17,562
observations with all the available rigidity data. In that regression, all co-
efficients of the rigidity proxies remain negative and, with the exception
of b Multinational, significant with confidence 0.95 or better. Firm age is
statistically zero. Firm age remains insignificant also in Regression 7, where
we use Product rigidities 2 as our proxy for product rigidities to increase the
sample size. The rigidity proxies maintain negative and significant coeffi-
cients similar to those observed in the individual regressions. In this regres-
sion, the coefficient of b Old drops by more than half in size compared with
the regression without rigidity proxies (not shown in a separate table) and is
also statistically insignificantly different from zero. Hence, jointly, we
conclude that the four rigidities can explain the negative relation between
takeover hazard and company age.
5.3 DISCUSSION
Since firms gradually run out of valuable growth opportunities when
they get older (Loderer, Stulz, and Waelchli, 2014), one would expect
them to engage more frequently in restructuring activities. It could be
that mature firms choose forms of restructuring other than merger.
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A detailed analysis of this question goes beyond the scope of this article.
However, we can use the evidence provided in extant papers to find a pre-
liminary answer.
Older firms could reposition themselves strategically by acquiring rather
than merging with other firms. The evidence in Arikan and Stulz (2013),
however, is inconsistent with the prediction that acquisition frequency in-
creases with company age. According to their results, the acquisition rate is a
u-shaped function of firm age and there is no difference between young and
old firms in terms of acquisition frequency. Moreover, it is firms with better
growth opportunities that are more likely to make acquisitions irrespective
of their lifecycle stage.
Mature firms could also restructure by disposing of core assets. Berchtold,
Loderer, and Waelchli (2014) find that both the probability of asset sales as
well as the size of the divested assets do indeed increase with firm age.
Their evidence also shows, however, that mature firms are more likely to
dispose of assets which are not part of their core activities and which have a
higher-valued use under different management. Moreover, mature firms do
not use the divestiture proceeds to acquire other firms or assets, or to fund
their capital expenditures or their R&D effort. Instead, they pay the money
out to debtholders and shareholders. Hence, this evidence combined with the
results in Loderer, Stulz, and Waelchli (2014) that mature firms also invest
less and engage less in R&D to begin with, does not support the hypothesis
that older firms restructure more frequently to revitalize their growth
opportunities.
6. Firm Age and Financial Failure Hazard
Our econometric approach controls for competing risks. Hence, our
results provide insights also into the age-dependence of financial failure
hazard. As mentioned in Section 1, the existing literature reports incon-
clusive results in this respect. The results in Table III indicate that the
hazard of financial failure actually falls significantly with firm age in
spite of controlling for various drivers of failure risk. As mentioned in
Section 1, this effect could reflect learning by investors, lenders, and the
firm, or local politics. Combined with the results for takeover hazard,
the decline in failure hazard implies that life expectancy increases with
firm age.
Interestingly, firm age significantly accelerates the financial failure
hazard at times of industry distress (Table VII). Since old firms are very
good at managing assets in place (Loderer, Stulz, and Waelchli, 2014), this
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finding suggests that they are particularly exposed to industry-wide threats
that devalue those assets. The effect is sizeable. The model implied condi-
tional failure hazard of an older firm increases from 1.72% to 4.01% if the
industry enters distress—an increase by a factor of 2.3. In contrast,
the implied failure hazard of a younger firm increases only by a factor of
1.3, namely from 2.17% to 2.84%. The higher failure rate of mature
firms at times of industry distress could explain the existence of a value
premium.5
7. Conclusions
We motivated the article with the question of what happens to firms over
time in view of the fact that they run out of growth opportunities and ex-
perience a steady decline in profitability. We focused on takeover hazard,
their main exit risk. The evidence shows that takeover hazard diminishes as
firms get older, an effect that is not only significant, but also economically
sizable.
We investigated possible reasons for this decline. The explanation that
survives the test of the data is that, over time, firms focus on what they
do best and thereby assume characteristics that are costly to unwind. This
lack of appeal gets compounded, we find, when exogenous, industry-wide
shocks reduce the potential benefits from merging with older firms.
Other explanations of the evidence are inconsistent with the data. That
includes an agency interpretation, namely that managers want to keep their
firms independent or want to live an easy life. We do not find any evidence
that older firms actively resist takeover.
In conclusion, not only do older firms run out of profitable investment
opportunities, they become unattractive M&A investment opportunities
themselves. They are also less likely to fail. The “perennial gale of creative
destruction” that sweeps over the economy (Schumpeter, 1975) seems to
abate when it comes to mature companies, except in the case of financial
failure at times of industry-wide distress.
5 We are grateful to the referee for pointing this out.
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Appendix A
Table AI. Variable definitions
In the regressions, all firm-specific variables, except for company age and Merton model’s
“naı¨ve” default probability, are standardized by industry and year. Standardized variables
are then denoted with the prefix s-. All regression arguments are lagged by 1 year. Binary
variables have the prefix b-.
Variable Definition
Firm age
Age Age is computed as one plus the difference between the year under
investigation and the firm’s year of incorporation.
b Old A dummy variable that identifies firms older than the median in any
given year.
Listing age Listing age is computed as one plus the difference between the year
under investigation and the firm’s year of listing.
Control variables
Cash The firm’s cash and short-term investments (che) divided by the book
value of its total assets (at – ceqþ csho*prcc_f – txdb).
Debt ratio The ratio of the book value of debt to the market value of the firm’s
assets.
Excess return The firm’s market-adjusted annual stock return. The market is the
CRSP value-weighted NYSE/AMEX index.
Focus The Herfindahl index, HE, captures the degree of specialization based
on the sales in the firm’s different segments, as reported on the
COMPUSTAT Segment tapes:
HE ¼
PN
i¼1 p
2
i ;
where N is the number of segments, the subscript i identifies the
segments, and pi is the fraction of the firm’s total sales in the
segment in question. Focus is a binary variable equal to 1 if the
firm’s Herfindahl index is 1, otherwise it equals 0.
GDP growth The relative change in the US gross domestic product. The data are
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the US Department of
Commerce.
Industry
concentration
We follow Giroud and Mueller (2010), among many others, and
measure the lack of competition of the firm’s industry (three-digit
SIC) with a Herfindahl index, HE:
HE ¼
PN
i¼1 s
2
i ;
where N is the number of firms in the same three-digit SIC industry,
the subscript i identifies the firms, and si is the firms’ market share
based on sales (sale). The higher the index, the less competitive the
industry becomes. To correct for potential misclassification, we drop
the top 2.5% of the firm-years at the right tail of the distribution
(Giroud and Mueller, 2010).
MTB equity The firm’s market value of equity divided by its book value of equity
(ceq).
MTB similarity The number of industry peers with similar MTB valuation, divided by
the total number of peers in the industry. We standardize MTB
equity by industry and year (s MTB equity) and assume similar
(continued)
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Table AI. Continued
Variable Definition
market capitalization if s MTB equity of a peer does not deviate
from the firm’s s MTB equity by more than 0.25.
Naı¨ve PD The “naı¨ve” default probability implied by Merton’s (1974) model (see
Bharath and Shumway, 2008).
Product similarity The log of the total product similarity measure (TNIC3TSIMM) from
Hoberg and Phillips (2010). The data are available for the sample
period 1996–2009. We regress Product similarity on MTB similarity,
Size, Size similarity, Industry concentration, and industry-fixed
effects and use the resulting coefficients to predict Product similarity
for the sample period before 1996.
Profitability Net income (ni) divided by book value total assets (ta).
Sales growth The ratio of the firm’s current sales (sale) divided by the sales of the
previous year minus 1. Sales figures are expressed in 2009 dollars.
Size The log of the market value of the firm’s assets (at– ceqþ csho*prcc_f
– txdb).
Size similarity The number of industry peers with similar market capitalization,
divided by the total number of peers in the industry. We standardize
the market value of equity by industry and year (s MVE) and
assume similar market capitalization if s MVE of a peer does not
deviate from the firm’s s MVE by more than 0.15.
Takeover intensity The number of other firms in the same three-digit SIC industry that
delist due to takeover, divided by the number of other firms in that
industry.
Tangibility The firm’s property, plant, and equipment (ppent) divided by Size.
Volatility The annualized standard deviation of the firm’s monthly stock return.
We calculate volatility over a 5-year window. The data are from the
monthly CRSP tapes.
Search cost measures
b High valuation Binary variable that identifies industries with a median equity market-
to-book ratio that is higher than the average of the historical median
equity-market-to-book ratio over the preceeding 5 years.
C&I Spread The commercial and industrial loan rates spreads over the intended
federal funds rate. The data are from the Boards of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System.
Antitakeover protection
b Dual class Binary variable that identifies firms with multiple classes of stock
outstanding.
b Golden parachute Binary variable that identifies firms with golden parachutes.
b Pill Binary variable that identifies firms that have a poison pill or a blank
check preferred stock authorization.
b Staggered board Binary variable that identifies firms with classified boards.
b Voting restrictions Binary variable that identifies firms with restrictions on shareholders to
vote by written consent or to call a special meeting.
Integration costs of mergers
Industry distress Binary variable that identifies industries with negative median sales
growth and median stock returns below 30% in any given year.
b Rigid costs In our sample, a 1% decline in sales is associated with only a 0.5%
decrease in overhead expenses. Anderson, Banker, and Janakiraman
(2003) report very similar numbers. We assume a firm has rigid costs
(continued)
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Table AI. Continued
Variable Definition
if its overhead expenses (expressed in 2009 dollars) drop by less than
0.5% in reaction to a 1% decrease in real sales.
b Rigid investments Binary variable that identifies firms that fail to respond to a positive
investment signal to the industry. We assume a three-digit SIC
industry i receives a positive signal if the median Tobin’s q of
another industry j within the same SIC division increases by more
than 20% points relative to the median change in Tobin’s q of
industry i. Failure to respond to that signal means that the firm’s
investment intensity (CapexþR&D, normalized by lagged book
assets) falls behind the industry average.
Product rigidities The negative value of the firm’s fluidity measure according to Hoberg,
Phillips, and Prabhala (2014).
Geographic dispersion The fraction of pretax income that comes from foreign operations.
b Multinational Binary variable that identifies firms with Geographic dispersion 6¼ 0.
Table AII. Descriptive statistics
The table provides descriptive statistics for the variables of relevance in the analysis. All
control variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile of their pooled distribution
across all firm-years. Variable definitions are in Table AI.
Mean Median Min Max Stev N
Company age
Listing age 17.5 13.0 5.0 85.0 13.91 83,790
Incorporation age 34.4 25.0 5.0 193.0 26.01 69,982
Age at listing 16.4 9.0 19.9 1.0 156.0 7,590
Control variables
Cash 0.153 0.074 0.000 0.840 0.187 83,787
Debt ratio 0.192 0.147 0.000 0.727 0.184 83,532
Excess return 0.033 0.113 0.977 4.314 0.772 82,589
Focus 0.836 1.000 0.245 1.000 0.241 83,790
GDP growth 0.029 0.032 0.026 0.072 0.019 83,790
Industry concentration 0.207 0.161 0.029 0.965 0.157 81,280
MTB equity 2.475 1.627 9.006 24.042 3.736 83,787
MTB similarity 0.475 0.500 0.000 1.000 0.273 83,787
Naı¨ve PD 0.092 0.000 0.000 0.905 0.204 70,540
Product similarity 297.836 188.090 62.477 3,589.867 342.383 82,115
Profitability 0.010 0.039 1.056 0.364 0.207 82,408
Sales growth 0.098 0.040 0.705 2.638 0.415 82,894
Size 2,076.478 236.119 4.499 44,174.280 6,101.449 83,790
Size similarity 0.588 0.727 0.000 1.000 0.335 83,790
Takeover intensity 0.042 0.031 0.000 1.000 0.053 83,238
Tangibility 0.297 0.243 0.009 0.895 0.223 83,725
Volatility 0.152 0.140 0.050 0.362 0.066 81,874
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Appendix B: Robustness Tests
1. Firm Size
Old firms could be relatively unattractive merger partners because they are
larger, and the costs of absorbing larger targets are higher (Palepu, 1986).
Tables II and III do control for firm size. Size, however, could have a
Table AIII. Alternative interpretations of the age effect on takeover hazard
The table investigates alternative interpretations of the effect of company age on takeover
hazard. Each row in the table reports coefficient estimates for the standard competing risk
model of Table III (M-Logit 3) when adding the variable listed in the first column to the
control variables along with an interaction term of b Old with that variable. The results are
statistically and economically the same when we alternatively estimate interaction effects
using the procedure suggested by Norton, Wang, and Ai (2004). For reading convenience,
we show only the coefficient of firm age, the coefficient of the variable in question, and the
coefficient of the interaction term. Each section tests a different explanation for the negative
time dependence of takeover hazard. The first section investigates the importance of firm
size. The second section focuses on potential imbalances between growth and available
resources. The third section examines the potential dissipation of resources. The fourth
section investigates the relevance of management age. Finally, the fifth section inquires
into the role of industry age. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported
in parentheses. Variable definitions are in Table AI. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% two-tailed level, respectively.
b Old Row variable Interaction
Controls(1) (2) (3)¼ (1) and (2)
Firm size
s Size –0.182*** 0.211*** –0.288*** Included
(0.050) (0.045) (0.050)
Growth–resource imbalance
b Growth–resource imbalance –0.186*** 0.061 0.015 Included
(0.061) (0.064) (0.096)
Dissipation of resources
b High R&D and b Low growth –0.169*** –0.064 –0.206 Included
(0.052) (0.110) (0.182)
b High capex and b Low growth –0.135** 0.027 –0.231** Included
(0.058) (0.072) (0.105)
Management team
b Old board –0.429** –0.496** 0.353 Included
(0.203) (0.250) (0.322)
b Old CEO –0.262* 0.065 –0.174 Included
(0.149) (0.163) (0.215)
Industry age
b Old industry –0.221*** –0.068 0.096 Included
(0.069) (0.070) (0.098)
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different impact on the takeover likelihood of young and old firms, which
could explain the negative relation between takeover hazard and age.
To find out, we add an interaction term of s Size and b Old to our
standard competing risk model in Table III (M-Logit 3). Measuring
company age with b Old facilitates the interpretation. The conclusions are
the same when we measure age with ln(Age). The results are in the first
section of Table AIII. For convenience, the section reports only the
coefficients of b Old, s Size, and the interaction term of s Size with b Old.
According to the results, allowing for different coefficients of size depending
on firm age does not erase the negative coefficient of age.
2. Imbalance between Growth Opportunities and Available Resources
Palepu (1986) and Powell and Yawson (2007) argue that takeover threats
materialize because of an imbalance between growth opportunities and
available resources. If these imbalances declined over time, company age
could be a proxy for reduced imbalances. The second section of Table
AIII tests that possibility. We assume there is an imbalance between
growth and available resources (b Growth–resource imbalance) when a
firm exhibits one of the following characteristics: (i) below-average growth
opportunities and above-average cash holdings or (ii) above-average growth
opportunities and below-average cash holdings. The results show, however,
that b Old maintains its negative and significant coefficient.
3. Decreased Dissipation of Resources over Time
It could also be that the market for corporate control prevents the
dissipation of resources (Schumpeter, 1975; Jensen, 2000). We measure the
waste of resources with an interaction term of high discretionary investments
and low growth opportunities. Discretionary investments are, alternatively,
R&D and capital expenditures (see, e.g., Minton and Schrand, 1999).
Loderer, Stulz, and Waelchli (2014) show that these activities decline as
firms get older. Hence, the potential dissipation problem, which takeover
could correct, declines over time. That could explain the negative relation
between company age and takeover hazard. To test this interpretation, we
add the interaction term to our competing risk model. The results are in the
third section of the Table AIII. The coefficient of company age remains
negative and significant, regardless of how we measure discretionary
investments.
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4. Company Age versus Age of Managers and Directors
Older firms have older managers (Loderer, Stulz, and Waelchli, 2014), and
older managers could try to protect their jobs. What looks like a firm age
effect could actually be a management age effect. To find out, we collected
data on CEO and director age from ExecuComp and Risk Metrics,
respectively.6 We then reestimated the competing risk model with the
alternative addition of two binary variables that measure above average
ages of CEO and directors, respectively. According to the fourth section
of Table AIII, firms with old boards face indeed a significantly lower
takeover risk. Also firms with old CEOs do, although the coefficient is
significant only in a one-sided test. However, and more important, the
coefficient of firm age remains negative and significant in both regressions.
If anything, it is numerically larger.
Jenter and Lewellen (2014) find that takeover likelihood increases once the
CEO has reached retirement age. We reestimated the regression specification
in the third section and controlled for the presence of CEOs with age 65
years and higher. The coefficient of company age, however, remained
negative and significant. As in Jenter and Lewellen (2014), old CEOs tend
to increase the likelihood of takeover, but the effect was statistically
insignificant (not shown).
5. Company Age and Management Talent
The firm age effect could also reflect management talent. If older
organizations were more likely to be managed by talented individuals,
they would be managed efficiently, which could explain why takeover risk
drops over time. We used CEO tenure and CEO total compensation as
proxies for talent and included these variables as additional controls in
our hazard model. According to the results, however, the coefficient of
firm age remained negative and significant (not shown). The coefficients of
CEO tenure and CEO total compensation were statistically zero.
6. Industry Age
Merger activity could be concentrated in young, unconsolidated industries.
Small players in those industries might merge to achieve the necessary
economies of scale (so-called roll-up mergers; see, e.g., Bower, 2001). If
firm age was correlated with industry age, a negative firm age dependence
6 Data on CEO age start in 1992, and data on director age are available from 1996.
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of takeover hazard would follow quite naturally. To address the issue of
industry age, the fifth section of Table AIII expands our hazard model with
the addition of a binary variable that identifies firms that operate in
relatively mature industries (b Old industry) and an interaction term of
that variable with b Old. We test whether under this specification the
negative age-dependence of takeover hazard disappears. Yet it does not.
The old firm dummy b Old maintains its negative and significant coefficient.
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